It would be a mistake to assess the significance of Kazakhstan’s parliamentary elections, held on Aug. 24, solely through the distribution of mandates or the results achieved by individual parties. What is far more important is the broader political and institutional process of which these elections are both a consequence and another stage.
In recent years, Kazakhstan has embarked on a distinctive path of evolutionary political modernization, the central element of which is not the sudden dismantling of the existing system, but its gradual transformation. The elections were held within the framework of the new constitutional system.
Following the March referendum, the former bicameral Parliament ceased to exist, and a unicameral Kurultai consisting of 145 deputies was established. Therefore, these elections were not merely about electing a new parliament; they represented the first real test of the functioning of Kazakhstan’s renewed political institutional system.
From this perspective, voter turnout deserves particular attention. According to official results, around 9.35 million citizens took part in the vote, representing a turnout of 74.08%. This is significantly higher than the 54.19% turnout recorded in the 2023 parliamentary elections.
Of course, high voter turnout alone does not prove the democratic nature of a political system, but it does indicate that a significant part of society regarded the elections as a relevant political act. The clear winner of the elections was Adilet, which received 71.17% of the vote and secured 110 seats.
At the same time, four other political forces also entered the Kurultai: Auyl, Respublica, Aq Zhol and the Nationwide Social Democratic Party. This, of course, does not yet amount to a competitive multiparty democracy in the Western sense. Kazakhstan’s political system remains strongly presidential, and the dominance of Adilet is unlikely to change this fact in the near future.
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the current democratic condition of a political system and the direction of its democratic development. I believe it is primarily the latter that should be examined. The reform process launched after 2022 — the concept of a Just Kazakhstan announced by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev — has gradually been changing the relationship between the state and society.
This process has included constitutional reform, the transformation of political institutions, changes to the party system, amendments to the electoral system, and efforts to expand institutional channels for political participation. For this reason, the current elections should not be interpreted in isolation, but rather as part of this multi-year reform cycle.
At the same time, criticism should not be ignored. According to the preliminary assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were technically well prepared; however, political pluralism remains limited, and concerns were raised regarding media freedom, the legal framework and certain aspects of the vote-counting process.
These are precisely the issues that Astana will need to address substantively during the next phase of reforms. On the other hand, the complexity of Kazakhstan’s development model is reflected in the fact that the European Union itself acknowledged the significant reform of the political system carried out in recent months, as well as the fact that, despite the short preparation period, the elections were organized and conducted in an orderly manner.