ASTANA — As competition between the world’s major powers increasingly reshapes trade routes, energy flows and diplomatic alignments, Kazakhstan’s strategic value may lie not in choosing sides, but in remaining able to connect several sides at once, experts said at a policy discussion in Astana.
The discussion on Aug. 21, organized by the CFive Intellectual Platform and the Hudson Institute, brought together perspectives from the US, Kazakhstan and Switzerland on the changing dynamics across Eurasia. Photo credit: cfive.org The discussion on Aug. 21, organized by the CFive Intellectual Platform and the Hudson Institute, brought together perspectives from the United States, Kazakhstan and Switzerland on the changing dynamics across Eurasia.
What made the exchange particularly revealing was that the speakers offered no single interpretation of Kazakhstan’s role. One saw the country as a pivotal swing state in the emerging U.S.-China competition; another warned against viewing Central Asia through the interests of major powers alone; and a third stressed that Kazakhstan’s most valuable asset could ultimately be trust.
Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute Ken Moriyasu, described Kazakhstan as “the most important swing state in the world.” Photo credit: cfive.org For senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and an expert on Greater Asia, Central Asia and the Caucasus Ken Moriyasu, Kazakhstan is not simply another strategically located middle power.
He described it as the “most important swing state in the world,” noting that Central Asia, the Caucasus and Türkiye could become an increasingly important arena in the competition between the U.S. and China. Moriyasu’s argument rests on the view that China is seeking to reduce its vulnerability to maritime chokepoints by expanding alternative routes across the Eurasian landmass, including pipelines and railways connecting China with Central Asia, the Caspian region, Russia and Europe.
“What will happen, I think, is a two-step. First, China will try to establish alternative routes through the Eurasian landmass, so pipelines and railroads. These are insular from the U.S. Navy,” he said. In his assessment, the more China can secure access to energy and trade through routes that are less vulnerable to maritime disruption or sanctions, the greater its strategic confidence will become.
That makes Kazakhstan important not simply because of its size or energy resources, but because of its position at the intersection of several of these routes. Moriyasu went further, saying Washington does not need to replace Russia or China in Central Asia to affect Beijing’s calculations.
“The beauty for the U.S. is that all it has to do is create doubt in China’s mentality. China needs to be absolutely confident, 100% confident, that it can continue its trade with Europe and continue to import energy without being interrupted by the U.S. Navy after a Taiwan invasion.
All America has to do is reduce the 100% confidence to 99% confidence, because if it’s 99%, Xi Jinping will not do it,” he said. It was an intentionally provocative framing of Kazakhstan’s importance: not as a country that would choose between Washington and Beijing, but as one whose infrastructure, geography and foreign-policy choices could indirectly affect the calculations of much larger powers.
But that approach immediately raised another question: is Kazakhstan really a “swing state” in somebody else’s contest, or does that description itself miss what Central Asian states are trying to achieve? Bulat Sarsenbayev, a career diplomat and former Kazakh ambassador to India and Jordan, pushed back against viewing the region primarily through the prism of great-power competition.